Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game

Loukas Balafoutas

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Abstract: This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who is averse to letting the public down. We study how the behavior of the lobby and the bureaucrat depend on perceived public beliefs, when these are constant and when they are allowed to vary over time. With time-varying beliefs, corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefsare initially low and are updated fast.

Keywords: Social; Sciences; &; Humanities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-14
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00978259
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2011, 78 (1-2), pp.51. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2010.12.007⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game (2011)
Journal Article: Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game (2011)
Working Paper: Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00978259

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.12.007

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