Matching Technology and the Choice of Punishment Institutions in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Veronika Grimm () and Friederike Mengel
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Veronika Grimm: Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre - FAU - Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg = University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

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Abstract: We experimentally investigate the effect of endogenous matching within a segmented population on peoples' willingness to cooperate as well as their attitudes towards cooperative norms. In the experiment participants can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them a (local) punishment institution fosters cooperation. The degree of population viscosity (i.e. the extent to which matching is biased towards within-group interactions) is varied across treatments. We find that both, the share of participants that choose into the group with the punishment institution and the share of participants that cooperate, increase monotonically with the degree of population viscosity. Furthermore - with higher population viscosity - significantly more subjects claim to support a punishment institution in a post-experimental questionnaire.

Keywords: C92; Population Viscosity; C70; C73; Z13; C92.; Experiments; Cooperation; Punishment Institutions; Evolution; Population Viscosity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00989519
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2011, ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.018⟩

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Journal Article: Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner's dilemma game (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00989519

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.018

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