INVESTISSEURS INSTITUTIONNELS, RELATIONS COMMERCIALES ET D'AFFAIRES ET CONTRÔLE: CAS DE LA FRANCE

Noura Ben M'Bareck
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Noura Ben M'Bareck: Al Imam Ibn Saud - Al Imam Ibn Saud

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Abstract: Despite the increase of their equity ownership, their power and easy access to private information, institutional investors do not exercise systematically active control of companies. Trade and business links they may have with companies can prevent them from having active control behavior and encourage them to remain passive. This study which is based on interviews and a questionnaire shows that indeed trade and business relations continue to curb shareholder activism in France. Our study also shows that financial institutions maintaining business relationships with firms in their portfolios are less active than those with less such links.

Keywords: Institutional investors; Trade and business relationships; Conflicts of interest; Control; Investisseurs institutionnels; Relations commerciales et d'affaires; Conflits d'intérêts; Contrôle. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05-31
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Published in Comptabilité sans Frontières..The French Connection, May 2013, Canada. pp.cd-rom

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00999670

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