Emission taxes and the market for abatement goods and services
Alain-Désiré Nimubona () and
Post-Print from HAL
This paper examines the effect of emission taxes on pollution abatement and social welfare, when abatement goods and services are provided by a Cournot oligopoly with free-entry. We point out initially that a higher tax not only increases demand for abatement; it also makes polluters less sensitive to price. This attracts a larger number of abatement suppliers while possibly inducing each one of them to produce less. Total abatement always goes up, however, when the delivery of abatement goods and services exhibits decreasing returns to scale. We then calculate the welfaremaximizing-emission tax and compare it to the Pigouvian tax.
Keywords: EMISSION TAX; ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURE; ECO-INDUSTRIE; FREE-ENTRY OLIGOPOLY; STRUCTURE DE MARCHE ENDOGENE; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; FREE ENTRY; ECO INDUSTRY; OLIGOPOLY; TAXATION; COMPETITION; INDUSTRIE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01019345
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, 2011, 33 (1), pp.179-191. ⟨10.1016/j.reseneeco.2010.04.010⟩
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Journal Article: Emission taxes and the market for abatement goods and services (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01019345
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().