Lobbying in the European Union: From Sui Generis to a Comparative Perspective

Cornelia Woll ()
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Cornelia Woll: CERI - Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This article reviews the literature on lobbying in the European Union. After initial surveys of the landscape of non-governmental actor participation, theoretical investigations have focused on the modes of network governance and later on the phenomenon of Europeanization. Yet studies have increasingly moved away from considering EU lobbying as a sui generis phenomenon. Normalizing the study of interest group participation in the EU and understanding the opportunities and constraints that are characteristic for it has led more and more scholars to adopt a comparative perspective. The most interesting parallels exist between Washington and Brussels, but unfortunately there have been very few attempts to explore the connection between the American literature on lobbying and EU studies. This article makes a first step towards such a comparison and points to concepts common in comparative politics that could provide considerable insight into the study of EU lobbying.

Keywords: European Union; institutional constraints; interests groups; lobbying; opportunity structure; United States (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01021182
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Published in Journal of European Public Policy, 2006, 13 (3), pp.456-470. ⟨10.1080/13501760600560623⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01021182

DOI: 10.1080/13501760600560623

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