A note on quantity precommitment, Cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs

Nicolas Gruyer
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Nicolas Gruyer: LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile

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Abstract: This paper extends Kreps and Scheinkman's 1983 result, which shows that a production capacity choice stage followed by price competition yields the same outcome as a Cournot game, to a setting where capacity costs are asymmetric.

Keywords: asymmetric costs; Bertrand competition; capacity; Kreps-Scheinkman (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021567
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (1), pp 384-391

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01021567

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