Congestion in European Airspace: a pricing solution ?

Marianne Raffarin
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Marianne Raffarin: LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile

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Abstract: This article deals with Air Traffic Control (ATC) pricing as a means of sorting out the European airspace congestion problem. For several years the situation has been worsening. Insufficient capacity of the ATC system, poor coordination between European ATC providers, and a high traffic level, as a consequence of economic growth, price competition, and hub-and-spoke organisation, explain a congested sky. The present ATC pricing rule is not designed to solve this problem. Components of this rule do not give airlines incentives to modify their choices. The article makes a proposal for a new rule, so that the airlines' equilibrium choices are also optimal choices, from a social point of view.

Date: 2004-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021572
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Published in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2004, 38 (1), pp 109-125

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01021572

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