European competition policy modernization: from notifications to legal exception

Frédéric Loss (frederic.loss@dauphine.fr), Estelle Malavolti (estelle.malavolti@enac.fr), Thibaud Vergé and Fabian Bergès-Sennou
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Estelle Malavolti: LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile
Thibaud Vergé: LEI - Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle - Centre de Recherche en Économie et STatistique (CREST)

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Abstract: Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force in May 2004 and replaced the mandatory notification of agreements by a regime of ex post monitoring. This paper shows that ex post monitoring is the optimal audit regime when the competition authority's probability of error is low. On the other hand, the notification system becomes optimal when the competition authority's probability of error is high. The paper also shows that block exemptions and black list (regimes of per se (il)legality) should be implemented when the agreements' expected welfare impact is very high and very low, respectively.

Keywords: competition policy; imperfect audit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021575v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in European Economic Review, 2008, 52 (1), pp 77-98. ⟨10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.02.001⟩

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Journal Article: European competition policy modernization: From notifications to legal exception (2008)
Working Paper: European Competition Policy Modernization: From Notifications to Legal Exception (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01021575

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.02.001

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