Auctioning airport slots (?)

Nicolas Gruyer and Nathalie Lenoir ()
Additional contact information
Nicolas Gruyer: LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile
Nathalie Lenoir: LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The current allocation of slots on congested European airports constitutes an obstacle to the effective liberalisation of air transportation undertaken in Europe. With a view to favouring efficient slot utilisation and competition, as is the goal of the European commission, we propose to use a market mechanism, based on temporary utilisation licences. In order to allocate those licences, we propose and describe an iterated combinatorial auction mechanism where a percentage of licences would be reallocated each season. A secondary market would also be set up in order to reallocate slots during a season. Since a combinatorial auction involve a complex optimisation procedure, we describe how it can be made to work in the case of auctions.

Keywords: slots; airports; licence; auctions; combinatorial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021718
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in ATRS 2003, Air Transport Research Society World Conference, Jul 2003, Toulouse, France. pp xxxx

Downloads: (external link)
https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021718/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01021718

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().