Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games

Tristan Tomala

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Abstract: This paper considers a general model of repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We study belief-free communication equilibria (BFCE) defined as follows. Players communicate with a mediator who receives types and signals and recommends actions. A BFCE is a communication device such that all players have an incentive to play faithfully, irrespectively of their belief about the state. We characterize BFCE payoffs for any repeated game with incomplete information in terms of one-shot payoff functions, information, and signaling structure.

Keywords: repeated games; incomplete information imperfect monitoring; communication equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2013, 38 (4), pp.617-637. ⟨10.1287/moor.2013.0594⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01026126

DOI: 10.1287/moor.2013.0594

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