Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism

Gaël Giraud and Hubert Stahn

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Abstract: We deal with the problem of providing incentives for the implementation of competitive outcomes in a pure-exchange economy with finitely many households. We construct a feasible price-quantity mechanism, which fully implements Walras equilibria via Nash equilibria in fairly general environments. Traders' preferences need neither to be ordered nor continuous. In addition, the mechanism is such that no pure strategy is weakly dominated, hence is bounded (in the sense of Jackson 1992). In particular it makes no use of any integer game.

Keywords: Strategic boundedness; Weakly dominated strategy; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
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Published in Review of Economic Design, 2013, 17 (1), pp.43-62. ⟨10.1007/s10058-012-0138-2⟩

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Journal Article: Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism (2013)
Working Paper: Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism (2013)
Working Paper: Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01052680

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0138-2

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