Prosecutor and lawyers in plea bargaining with complete information

Philippe Delacote and Lydie Ancelot ()
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Lydie Ancelot: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In criminal law, when a conflict is solved by plea bargaining, the negotiation is mainly made between the prosecutor and the lawyer. Adopting a complete information framework about his type (selfish or altruistic), this paper compares two lawyer payment systems: flat fees and hourly-wage fees. We identify the system of fees in which the sentence is the lowest. We first show that under flat fees the prosecutor provides less effort when he faces an altruistic lawyer. Second, we show that under some conditions an altruistic lawyer may accept a higher sentence than a selfish lawyer.

Keywords: Criminal law; Plea bargaining; Lawyer's selfishness; System of fees; Négociation de plaidoyer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01072324v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (3), pp.1929-1936

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Journal Article: Prosecutor and lawyers in plea bargaining with complete information (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01072324

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