Reduced form wage equations in the credible bargaining model

Vincent Boitier () and Antoine Lepetit
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Vincent Boitier: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We derive an analytical solution for the wage from an alternating-offer wage bar-gaining game à la Hall and Milgrom (2008) under a plausible parameter restriction. This solution is simple, micro-founded and permits a transparent analysis of the driv-ing forces of wages. We argue that it can be used in a wide range of economic models incorporating the search and matching theory of unemployment to simplify the anal-ysis and obtain more easily interpretable results.

Keywords: search and matching models; credible bargaining; wage rigidity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01088831
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Labour Economics, 2018, 50, pp.92-96. ⟨10.1016/j.labeco.2016.04.003⟩

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Journal Article: Reduced form wage equations in the credible bargaining model (2018)
Working Paper: Reduced form wage equations in the credible bargaining model (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01088831

DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2016.04.003

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