CEO optimism and incentive compensation

Clemens A. Otto
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Clemens A. Otto: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts.

Keywords: CEO optimism; Incentive compensation; Compensation contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

Published in Journal of Financial Economics, 2014, 114 (2), pp.366-404. ⟨10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.06.006⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01097589

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.06.006

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