SPONTANEOUS UNILATERAL COMMITMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

Engagement unilatéral spontané en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux

Sylvain Zeghni (), Gilles Rotillon and Tarik Tazdait
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Gilles Rotillon: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Tarik Tazdait: CIRED - centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper which deals with global environmental problems, we use an evo-lutionary approach in order to determine the conditions under which O.E.C.D countries are led to reduce unilaterally their pollution emissions. Thus we remark that a country's choice of a unilateral reduction depends on the information at its disposal concerning the other nations' characteristics. Where such information is complete, the commitment emerges as the result of a strategical calculation. The conclusion seems less obvious in a case of asymmetrical information where eve-rything leads us to believe that the commitment would be bound to fail.

Keywords: Environnement; Négociations internationales; Théorie des jeux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Revue Economique, 1996, 47 (3), pp.601-610

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01100891

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