Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?

Sylvain Zeghni (), Gilles Rotillon and Tarik Tazdaït
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Gilles Rotillon: EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This model deals with the problem of the greenhouse effect—a problem of transfrontier pollution. It consists of determining, through the description of a bargaining process, the conditions under which it is preferable for the developing countries to speak with a united voice, and those conditions under which it is preferable for them to negotiate separately one from the other. In particular it is shown that the agreements arising from the bargaining cannot be equitable, and for that reason they include only a limited number of countries.

Keywords: Environment; Global Change; Multilateral Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Ecological Economics, 1996, 18 (2), pp.177-187

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Journal Article: Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change? (1996)
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