Dynamics of profit- sharing games

J. Augustine (), Ning Chen (), Edith Elkind, Angelo Fanelli (), Nick Gravin and Dmitry Shiryaev
Additional contact information
J. Augustine: IIT Madras - Indian Institute of Technology Madras
Ning Chen: NTU - Nanayang Technological University
Edith Elkind: Computing Science Laboratory - Oxford University - University of Oxford, NTU - Nanayang Technological University
Angelo Fanelli: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Nick Gravin: NTU - Nanayang Technological University, Microsoft Research [Redmond] - Microsoft Corporation [Redmond, Wash.]
Dmitry Shiryaev: NTU - Nanayang Technological University

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Abstract: An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality. We consider settings whereby each team's profit is given by a submodular function and propose three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they keep changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so. We study the properties (such as closeness to Nash equilibrium or total profit) of the states that result after a polynomial number of such moves, and prove bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the corresponding games.

Keywords: Nash dynamics; non-cooperative games; profit sharing; cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Internet Mathematics, 2015, 11 (1), pp.1-22. ⟨10.1080/15427951.2013.830164⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01103929

DOI: 10.1080/15427951.2013.830164

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