On lookahead equilibria in congestion games

Vittorio Bilò (), Angelo Fanelli () and Luca Moscardelli ()
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Vittorio Bilò: Dipartimento di Matematica Ennio De Giorgi - Università del Salento = University of Salento [Lecce]
Angelo Fanelli: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Luca Moscardelli: Dipartimento di Scienze - Universita di Chieti-Pescara - UNICH - Universita' degli Studi "G. d'Annunzio" Chieti-Pescara

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Abstract: We investigate the issues of existence and efficiency of lookahead equilibria in congestion games. Lookahead equilibria, whose study has been initiated by Mirrokni et al. [10], correspond to the natural extension of pure Nash equilibria in which the players, when making use of global information in order to predict subsequent reactions of the other ones, have computationally limited capabilities.

Keywords: congestion; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Published in Yiling Chen; Nicole Immorlica. Web and Internet Economics, 8289, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp.54-67, 2013, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 978-3-642-45045-7. ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_6⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01104063

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_6

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