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Jeremy Bentham and the economic efficiency of legal rules

Jeremy Bentham et l’efficience économique du droit

Marco Guidi and Nathalie Sigot ()
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Nathalie Sigot: PHARE - Philosophie, Histoire et Analyse des Représentations Économiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This article aims at showing how Bentham addressed the modern issue of the economic efficiency of the law (as defined by Posner) ; to do that, we focus on "Defence of Usury" [1787] and the manuscript "Sur les prix" [1801a] : in 1787, Bentham stated that, in order to increase wealth, the rate of interest should be freely determined by the market ; in 1801, he called for a system of controlling the money supply growth. The relationship between market and rules is thus fundamental ; with usury laws, rules are intended to replace market, although market is more efficient and opens many possibilities of circumvention (I), while Bentham plead for a complementary relationship between rules and market, in the case of his proposals for controlling the money supply (II).

Keywords: History of economic thought; posner; rules; Bentham; usury; legislation; money; théorie monétaire; loi sur l'usure; Histoire de la pensée économique; lois; normes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
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Published in Revue Economique, 2014, 65 (2), pp.225-242. ⟨10.3917/reco.652.0225⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01104901

DOI: 10.3917/reco.652.0225

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