Redistribution by Means of Lotteries

Stephane Gauthier and Guy Laroque

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Abstract: A government designs transfers to agents in the absence of information on their preferences. The second-best allocation is equal sharing among citizens when the awards are deterministic. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which lotteries improve upon the egalitarian outcome. The condition requires that the citizens with large social weights have low risk aversion, and that the left tail of the distribution of risk aversion be sufficiently dispersed.

Keywords: Lerner egalitarianism; random redistribution; incentives; qualified constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01158155v1
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Published in 2015

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Related works:
Journal Article: Redistribution by means of lotteries (2017)
Working Paper: Redistribution by means of lotteries (2017)
Working Paper: Redistribution by means of lotteries (2017)
Working Paper: Redistribution by means of lotteries (2017)
Working Paper: Redistribution by Means of Lotteries (2015)
Working Paper: Redistribution by Means of Lotteries (2015)
Working Paper: Redistribution by Means of Lotteries (2015)
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