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Minimum safety standard, consumer's information and competition

Stéphan Marette ()

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Abstract: L'objectif de cet article est d'étudier le lien entre un standard minimal de sécurité et la structure de concurrence entre producteurs. Un modèle théorique montre que le standard de sécurité et le nombre de producteurs dépendent de la structure d'information des consommateurs sur la sécurité. En situation d'information parfaite, le standard de sécurité maximisant le surplus collectif préserve la concurrence entre producteurs. A l'inverse, en situation d'information imparfaite, le standard de sécurité conduit à une situation de monopole.

Keywords: QUALITY STANDARDS; PRODUCT QUALITY; PERFORMANCE STANDARDS; MARKET; LIABILITY; REPUTATIONS; DUOPOLY; CHOICE; LEMONS; ENTRY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2007, 32 (3), pp.259-285. ⟨10.1007/s11149-007-9036-x⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01172833

DOI: 10.1007/s11149-007-9036-x

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