Coalitional ZP-Equilibrium in Games and its Existence

Rabia Nessah (), M. Larbani and T. Tazdaït
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M. Larbani: Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences, IIUM University Jalan Gombak, 53100 Kuala Lumpur - affiliation inconnue
T. Tazdaït: CIRED - centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We introduce a solution concept for games in normal form with undetermined parameters, coalitional ZP-equilibrium, based on the notions of Z-equilibrium of [Zhukovskii and Chikrii [1994] Linear quadratic differential games, Kiev, Naoukova Doumka] and ZS-equilibrium of [Larbani and Lebbah [1999] A concept of equilibrium for a game under uncertainity. Europ. J. Oper. Res. 117, 145-156]. For each coalition structure, ZP-equilibrium ensures both the stability of the partition and equilibrium of coalitional strategies (in Pareto sense). We show that under some quasiconcavity conditions on payoff functions, the coalitional ZP-equilibrium exists in compact, convex and continuous normal form games involving undetermined parameters.

Date: 2015
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Published in International Game Theory Review, 2015, 17 (3), ⟨10.1142/s0219198915500024⟩

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Working Paper: Coalitional ZP-Equilibrium in Games and Its Existence (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01239782

DOI: 10.1142/s0219198915500024

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