 The Impact of Tax-Benefit Reforms on Labor Supply in a Simulated Nash-bargaining FrameworkOlivier Bargain and Nicolas Moreau Post-Print from HAL Abstract: Several theoretical contributions have suggested to model household behavior as a Nash-bargaining game. Yet very few attempts have been made to operationalize cooperative models of labor supply for policy analysis. In this paper, we implement a Nash-bargaining model with external threat points (divorce) into the microsimulation of tax-benefit policy reforms in France. The observation of divorced individuals is used to predict outside options and (some) of the preferences for individuals living in couples. Benchmark simulations are conducted in a way that guarantees consistency with the Nash bargaining setting, regularity conditions and observed behavior. We examine how the labor supply of couples adjusts to shocks on threat points, either hypothetical or generated by a radical tax-benefit reform. Keywords: Household labor supply; Nash-bargaining model; Personality and Social Psychology; Social Policy; Social Sciences; general; Sociology; Tax-benefit reform (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 2013, 34 (1), pp.77--86. ⟨10.1007/s10834-012-9300-9⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01245264 DOI: 10.1007/s10834-012-9300-9 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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