Funding sunk stranded costs with asymetric regulation

La régulation asymétrique: un mécanisme de financement des coûts échoués irrécupérables

Cédric Clastres (cedric.clastres@univ-grenoble-alpes.fr)
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Cédric Clastres: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]

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Abstract: Asymetric regulation in networks industries have impacted regulatory and competitive contexts. Questions of economic efficiency, collusion or fundings of sunk stranded costs go with asymetric regulation. Thus, regulators must adapt their policies to internalise these questions and to maximise the welfare. We show with a Cournot model regulators could fund sunk stranded costs, keeping allocative efficiency constant. Positive results on welfare rely on incumbent's efficiency and on prices of alternative supplies.

Keywords: sunk stranded costs; Asymetric regulation; forced competition; capacity constraints; concurrence forcée; coûts échoués irrécupérables; régulation asymétrique; contraintes de capacités (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/hal-01279582v1
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2016, 126 (1), pp.89-126. ⟨10.3917/redp.261.0089⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01279582

DOI: 10.3917/redp.261.0089

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