The Political Economy of Central Banking: Historical Perspectives

Stefano Ugolini

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The question of the relationship between monetary and fiscal authorities seems to be more complex than the recent debate on central bank independence would suggest. In the simple framework inspired by Sargent and Wallace (1976), the recipe for establishing an untarnished confidence in central bank money consisted in severing all links between governments and central bankers. In reality, however, monetary and fiscal authorities can hardly be separated at all: in fact, they are the two sides of the same coin – which is, the modern state. The idea that monetary and fiscal authorities can live their lives oblivious of each other does not seem to be validated by historical evidence.

Keywords: Political Economy; Central banking; Monetary Policy; Fiscal Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-tlse2.hal.science/hal-01294446v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in A Changing Role for Central Banks? 41st Economic Conference, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, pp.52-58, 2013

Downloads: (external link)
https://univ-tlse2.hal.science/hal-01294446v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01294446

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().