Rationality and (de-)regulation of the profession of lawyer: An analysis of competition in the market for legal services

Rationalité et (dé-)réglementation de la profession d’avocat: une analyse de la concurrence sur le marché des services juridiques

Camille Chaserant () and Sophie Harnay ()
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Sophie Harnay: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The legal profession is noticeably diverse and includes a real variety of law firms, services and values. While characterizing a specific market segment, the market-based logic of profit is not fully shared. This article questions its extension to the whole market of legal services deriving from current deregulation policies. Will it lead to a better performance of the market for legal services? We rest on an original approach to individual rationality in order to understand lawyers' reasons to comply with professional regulation and explain their responses to market deregulation. We find that deregulation may not lead to lower prices and higher quality as it is usually expected.

Keywords: Services juridiques; Cadrage framing; Rationalité; Dérégulation; Conformation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Published in Revue Economique, 2016, 67 (HS1), pp.171-183. ⟨10.3917/reco.hs01.0171⟩

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Working Paper: Rationality and (de-)regulation of the profession of lawyer: An analysis of competition in the market for legal services (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01297138

DOI: 10.3917/reco.hs01.0171

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