Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game

Raphaële Préget (), Phu Nguyen Van () and Marc Willinger
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Phu Nguyen Van: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Phu Nguyen-Van

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Abstract: We rely on the methodology of Fischbacher et al. (2001) in order to identify subjects' behavioral types. We then link the likelihood to act as a leader in a repeated public goods game to the elicited behavioral types. The leader in a group is defined as the subject who voluntarily decides in the first place about his contribution. The leader's contribution is then reported publicly to the remaining group members who take their contribution decisions simultaneously. Our main findings are that leaders emerge in almost all rounds and that subjects who are identified as conditional cooperators are more likely to act as leaders than other types, e.g. free-riders or triangle-contributors. We also find that voluntary leaders, irrespective of their behavioral type, contribute always more than followers. However the presence of leadership does not prevent the decay that is commonly observed in linear public goods experiments.

Keywords: Voluntary Contribution Mechanism; Leadership; Public Goods; Experimental Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cse, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01300195v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published in Theory and Decision, 2016, First online: 11 May 2016 (4), ⟨10.1007/s11238-016-9550-3⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game (2016)
Working Paper: Who are the Voluntary Leaders? Experimental Evidence from a Sequential Contribution Game (2012)
Working Paper: Who are the Voluntary Leaders? Experimental Evidence from a Sequential Contribution Game (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01300195

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9550-3

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