Les partenariats public-privé institutionnalisés: intérêts, limites et risques d’une structure hybride public-privé

Julie de Brux and Frédéric Marty
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Julie de Brux: LAB IAE Paris - Sorbonne - IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School

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Abstract: Institutionalized Public‑Private Partnerships : Advantages, limits, and risks of an hybrid organisational structure — In July 2014, a new type a public‑private joint venture (Société d'économie mixte à opération unique) was created in France. This is the translation into French legislation of the European originated concept of institutionalized public‑private partnership (IPPP). This new governance modality for the development of public projects aims at addressing some of the limits of contractual public‑private partnerships, i.e. their financial costs, their opacity that impairs the public ontractor's control and their lack of flexibility that increases the risk of contractual hold‑ups. We show that although IPPPs address to some extent these difficulties, they may also induce other specific risks.

Keywords: Public‑private partnerships; hybrid structures; incentives; governance; control; Partenariats public‑privé; structures hybrides; incitations; gouvernance; contrôle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06-04
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Published in Revue française d’administration publique, 2016, 2016-1 (157), pp.223-238. ⟨10.3917/rfap.157.0223⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01326822

DOI: 10.3917/rfap.157.0223

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