La presse en tant que mécanisme de gouvernance disciplinaire

Karen Moris ()
Additional contact information
Karen Moris: LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Fraud is a cause of substantial costs for firms. Fraud disclosure by the press would hence improve firms' rates of return. I study to what extent the French press acts as a watchdog-type mechanism of governance and what the determinants of this mechanism are. To address these issues, I investigate the efficacy of the French press in detecting fraud committed by firms before an official verdict by the courts. I observe that the French press can play an important role as a watchdog, but this role de- pends on its search for maximizing profits. Thus, the press selects the firms and the frauds on which it publishes articles.

Keywords: corporate governance; fraud; press; value creation; création de valeur; fraude; gouvernance d’entreprise; presse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2011, 14 (4), pp.21-66

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01346770

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().