The Shareholder Model of the Corporation, Between Mythology and Reality

Olivier Weinstein ()
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Olivier Weinstein: CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The corporate governance thought has been dominated since 30 years by the shareholder primacy model. Lynn Stout present us, in his brilliant book, The Shareholder Value Myth, a very clear and conclusive argumentation against this view. In my comments, I consider first some key critics of the shareholder value ideology and its foundations. Next, I address the question of the real nature of shareholders, and shareholders' interests, essential in the argumentation of Lynn Stout, before coming to critical issues concerning directors and managers. That is, first, the normative question of director's duties, and secondly the factual question of the nature of the top management in contemporary capitalism.

Keywords: corporate governance; theory of the firm; organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Accounting, Economics and Law: A convivium, 2013, 3 (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01361219

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