Economics at your fingertips  

French connections: interlocking directorates and ownership network in an insider governance system

Tristan Auvray () and Olivier Brossard ()
Additional contact information
Olivier Brossard: LEREPS - Laboratoire d'Etude et de Recherche sur l'Economie, les Politiques et les Systèmes Sociaux - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT - Université de Toulouse - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Toulouse - ENSFEA - École Nationale Supérieure de Formation de l'Enseignement Agricole de Toulouse-Auzeville

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We show that single and multiple overlapping directorships of large French listed corporations are highly explained by their ownership connections. Both large and small stakes, from 1% to 20% of cash-flow rights or voting rights, have high explanatory power. We provide evidence also of the existence of a positive relationship between the size of a shareholding and the strength of the correlation between ownership ties and overlapping directorates. Finally, we demonstrate that causality goes from ownership to interlocking directorates, for both unilateral stakes and cross- shareholdings.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Ownership Networks; Board Interlocks; Multiple Blockholders; réseau d’administrateurs; réseau de propriété; Gouvernance d’entreprise; actionnaires multiples (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Published in Revue d'économie industrielle , 2016, 154, pp.177-206. ⟨10.4000/rei.6377⟩

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.4000/rei.6377

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

Page updated 2023-08-12
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01372455