Confiance et régulation des organisations: que nous apporte la théorie contractuelle?

Emmanuel Okamba (okamba@univ-mlv.fr)
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Emmanuel Okamba: IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12

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Abstract: Organizations are fictions contracts punctuated by opportunistic behavior of the contracting parties who cooperate. They can operate in a deficit of confidence thanks to agreements between agents. But, they can not achieve optimal performance and should be content with a satisfactory performance.

Keywords: Jeux; contrat; convention; Confiance; Coopération (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-30
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01383300v1
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Published in Epistémè : revue internationale de sciences humaines et sociales appliquées / 에피스테메, 2016, 14, pp.99-119

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