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Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence From the European Union

Marie-Laure Allain (), Marcel Boyer (), Rachidi Kotchoni and Jean-Pierre Ponssard ()

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Date: 2014
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2014, 42, pp.38 - 47

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Journal Article: Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union (2013) Downloads
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