Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence From the European Union
Marie-Laure Allain (),
Marcel Boyer (),
Rachidi Kotchoni and
Jean-Pierre Ponssard ()
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2014, 42, pp.38 - 47
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Journal Article: Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union (2015)
Working Paper: Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01386062
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