La structure des crédits syndiqués comme défense contre les problèmes informationnels: une analyse empirique sur le marché français

Karima Bouaiss () and Catherine Refait-Alexandre
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Karima Bouaiss: Axe 2 (2011-2016) : « Marchés, Cultures de consommation, Autonomie et Migrations » (MSHS Poitiers) - MSHS de Poitiers - Maison des sciences de l'homme et de la société de Poitiers - UP - Université de Poitiers = University of Poitiers - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEREGE [Poitiers, La Rochelle] - Centre de recherche en gestion [EA 1722] - UP - Université de Poitiers = University of Poitiers - ULR - La Rochelle Université

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Abstract: This article shows that, in a loan syndicate, the leading bank determines the syndicate's structure and the contract design to protect participant banks from the risks of asym-metric information. Consequently, firms are not charged a higher spread for lack of transparency. We provide empirical evidence on spreads of syndicated loans in the French market , from 2004 to 2006. Syndicate structure and loan characteristics are shown to depend on the presence of asymmetric information, whereas the spread is essentially explained by default risk, syndicate structure and loan characteristics.

Keywords: syndicated loans; disclosure; asymmetric information; banking relationship; prêts syndiqués; transparence; asymétrie d'information; financement bancaire. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2009, 12 (2), pp.35 - 68

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Journal Article: La structure des crédits syndiqués comme défense contre les problèmes informationnels - Une analyse empirique sur le marché français (2009)
Working Paper: La structure des crédits syndiqués comme défense contre les problèmes informationnels – une analyse empirique sur le marché français (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01391670

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