La discrimination des prix dans un cadre de concurrence spatiale

Jean Siroen

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Abstract: In spatial competition models « à la Hotelling », we can treat simultaneously of two components of imperfect competition : product differentiation and price discrimination. We show that beyond a certain degree of monopoly, price discrimination maximizes the outcome of the firm especially when fixed costs are high for low marginal costs. Some goods with high fixed costs are produced only when price discrimination is feasible. Then, firms have to choose activities where the degree of monopoly is enough for a price discrimination policy.

Keywords: discrimination; dumping; économie spatiale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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Published in Revue d'économie industrielle , 1987, 42 (1), ⟨10.3406/rei.1987.2202⟩

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Journal Article: La discrimination des prix dans un cadre de concurrence spatiale (1987)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01393903

DOI: 10.3406/rei.1987.2202

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