Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour

Sidartha Gordon () and Alessandro Riboni

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Abstract: We consider a conflict under incomplete information where two opponents fight to impose their preferred policy. Before the conflict, one opponent (the agent) trusts the information received by his principal. Under some conditions, the principal induces hawkish attitudes in the agent: the agent never doubts the optimality of his preferred policy, conflicts are violent, and bad decisions are sometimes made. Under other conditions, the agent believes that his opponent may be right, even when all evidence indicates that the policy preferred by the opponent is certainly suboptimal. In this case, the agent adopts dovish attitudes and conflicts are less violent.

Keywords: dogmatism; Conflict; communication; naive agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Published in The Economic Journal, 2015, 125 (589), ⟨10.1111/ecoj.12326⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior (2014)
Working Paper: Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior (2014)
Working Paper: Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior (2014)
Working Paper: Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01408877

DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12326

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