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Lawyers’ Reputation and the Quality of Legal Services: An Economic Analysis of Self-Regulation

Camille Chaserant () and Sophie Harnay ()

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Abstract: Forthcoming

Date: 2013
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-univ-paris10.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01411773
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Published in Conference of the EAEPE (European Association of Evolutionary Political Economy), University Paris Nord , 2013, Paris, France

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Related works:
Working Paper: Lawyers’ Reputation and the Quality of Legal Services: An Economic Analysis of Self-Regulation (2013)
Working Paper: Lawyers’ Reputation and the Quality of Legal Services: An Economic Analysis of Self-Regulation (2013)
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