'Credibility as a trade off' in electricity industries, a first evaluation

Yannick Perez ()

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Abstract: In the early 1990s, Pablo Spiller worked on North & Williamson's application of the New Institutional Economics, on the conditions of credible network reforms. Credibility is defined as the capacity to provide reform commitments. This work, started from a Positive Political Economics Veto Point Model, has been constructed and applied with good results. The Author will show the consequences of the 'credibility as a trade off' concept in the efficiency of Regulatory Instruments studied and then introduce two improvements. Self-Regulation is introduced and their performance reconsidered in order to achieve the trade off between commitment and flexibility.

Keywords: new institutional economics; credibility; electricity; reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01424509
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Published in Global Business and Economics Review, 2005, 7, pp.278 - 278. ⟨10.1504/GBER.2005.007621⟩

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Journal Article: 'Credibility as a trade off' in electricity industries, a first evaluation (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01424509

DOI: 10.1504/GBER.2005.007621

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