Efficient networks in games with local complementarities

Mohamed Belhaj (mbelhaj@centrale-marseille.fr), Sebastian Bervoets and Frédéric Deroïan (frederic.deroian@univ-amu.fr)

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Abstract: We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of Nested-Split Graphs. Next, we refine our results and find that, depending on the specification of the network cost function, complete networks, core-periphery networks, dominant group architectures, quasi-star and quasi-complete networks can be efficient.

Keywords: nested split graphs; network games; strategic complementarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-01446213v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Published in Theoretical Economics, 2016, 11 (1), pp.357--380. ⟨10.3982/TE1742⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01446213

DOI: 10.3982/TE1742

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