International experiences on pay-for-performance programs and implications for China

Shu Jiang, Chuan Yan, Anne Girault (), Marie Ferrua (), Aude Fourcade, Philippe Loirat and Etienne Minvielle ()
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Shu Jiang: IGR - Institut Gustave Roussy, EA MOS - EA Management des Organisations de Santé - EHESP - École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP] - PRES Sorbonne Paris Cité
Chuan Yan: School of Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics, IGR - Institut Gustave Roussy
Anne Girault: EA MOS - EA Management des Organisations de Santé - EHESP - École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP] - PRES Sorbonne Paris Cité, IGR - Institut Gustave Roussy
Marie Ferrua: EA MOS - EA Management des Organisations de Santé - EHESP - École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP] - PRES Sorbonne Paris Cité, IGR - Institut Gustave Roussy
Aude Fourcade: EA MOS - EA Management des Organisations de Santé - EHESP - École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP] - PRES Sorbonne Paris Cité, IGR - Institut Gustave Roussy
Philippe Loirat: EA MOS - EA Management des Organisations de Santé - EHESP - École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP] - PRES Sorbonne Paris Cité, IGR - Institut Gustave Roussy
Etienne Minvielle: EA MOS - EA Management des Organisations de Santé - EHESP - École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP] - PRES Sorbonne Paris Cité, EHESP - École des Hautes Études en Santé Publique [EHESP], IGR - Institut Gustave Roussy

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Abstract: In the past decade, pay-for-performance (P4P) programs in the health care sector have been implemented throughout the world. These programs differ in their design, as they have different targets (hospitals or physicians) and different performance sectors incentivised. P4P has also been introduced to Chinese hospitals recently. This article reviews major P4P initiatives (programs of the U.K., U.S., France, etc.) and collects common design factors for analysis (targets, quality measures, incentive schemes, performance benchmarks, etc.). The pros and cons of each design factor are discussed, and some inevitable empirical pitfalls are also reviewed. It is anticipated that such international experiences can provide possible future reference for the Chinese hospital remuneration reform.

Keywords: Hospital management; Pay-for-performance; Healthcare quality; Incentive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Published in Chinese journal of health policy, 2015, 8 (2), pp.27-35

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01446322

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