Plunder and tribute in a Malthusian world

Kenneth Chan and Jean-Pierre Laffargue ()
Additional contact information
Jean-Pierre Laffargue: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We develop a dynamic game between an attacker and a defender country to investigate the effects of persistent war on the growth of nations in a Malthusian regime, under costly plunder and defense. We compute the stage-wise feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game, which depends on the relative military efficiency of defense and the time horizon of the sovereigns. Then, we compare this equilibrium to the one when the defender country can offer to buy peace with a tribute.

Keywords: deterrence; dynamic game; peace agreement; conflict; contest-success function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, 84, pp.138-150

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Plunder and tribute in a Malthusian world (2016)
Working Paper: Plunder and tribute in a Malthusian world (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01450734

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().