Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness

Jean Beuve () and Claudine Desrieux ()
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Jean Beuve: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Claudine Desrieux: CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas

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Abstract: Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts. We would like to thank

Keywords: Incomplete contract; relational contract; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://paris1.hal.science/hal-01463000v1
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31 (3), pp.2030 - 2040

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