Family governance and payout policies to shareholders

Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires

Patrice Charlier and Céline Du Boys ()
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Céline Du Boys: CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - UTLN - Université de Toulon

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Abstract: This paper studies payout policies of listed family firms. The recent evolutions of family firms models bring to study two types of agency conflicts, the one between shareholders and manager (type I), and the one between majority and minority shareholders (type II). Our results show that payout policies are related to the intensity of the two types of agency conflicts which are overall less strong than in non family firms.

Keywords: Dividend; family governance; agency problems I and II; signaling theory; behavioral ways; dividende; gouvernance familiale; conflits d'agence type I et II; théorie du signal; biais comportementaux (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-01470330v1
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Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2011, 1, pp.1-20

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01470330

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