L’assomption de risques économiques élargis: Une clé pour la refondation du capitalisme actionnarial

Hubert de La Bruslerie

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Abstract: Concentrated ownership and corporate control are characteristics of many economies, particularly in Europe. This leads to questions about the shareholders' limited liability as the controlling group is protected from the negative consequences of his decisions. We propose to extend the scope of the controlling group's legal liability in order to make him responsible for the CSR consequences of the decisions made by the firm. The controller is associated with long-term and strategic choices of the firm which may have a strong SCR dimension. This regulation mechanism will help to enforce CSR within firms. As counterparty and to develop a contractual mechanism, the controlling shareholder must receive a specific remuneration above his standard return as investor. The paper describes what is called the dividend for control.

Keywords: Actionnaires contrôlant; Bénéfices privés; Contrôle; Dividendes du contrôle; Responsabilité limitée; RSE; Corporate Control; Dividend; Firm; Ownership; Regulation; Shareholder; Standard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
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Published in La Revue du Financier, 2014, 36 (208-209)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01490691

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