Strategic interaction and aggregate incentives

Mohamed Belhaj () and Frédéric Deroïan ()

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Abstract: We consider a model of interdependent efforts, with linear interaction and lower bound on effort. Our setting encompasses asymmetric interaction and heterogeneous agents' characteristics. We examine the impact of a rise of cross-effects on aggregate efforts. We show that the sign of the comparative static effects is related to a condition of balancedness of the interaction. Moreover, we point out that asymmetry and heterogeneous characteristics are sources of non-monotonic variation of aggregate efforts.

Keywords: Aggregate efforts; Asymmetric interaction; Heterogeneous char; Social network; Strategic interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, 49 (3), pp.183-188. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.02.003⟩

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Journal Article: Strategic interaction and aggregate incentives (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01498253

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.02.003

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