Economics at your fingertips  

Potential Conflict and Inefficiencies Arising in Agri-environmental Management

Elsa Martin () and Hubert Stahn
Additional contact information
Elsa Martin: CESAER - Centre d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales Appliquées à l'Agriculture et aux Espaces Ruraux - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroSup Dijon - Institut National Supérieur des Sciences Agronomiques, de l'Alimentation et de l'Environnement

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We characterise the welfare implications of uncoordinated policy decisions in the presence of multiple externalities, illustrated with an aquifer. We concentrate on the problem of coordination that can occur when distinct agricultural and water authorities implement their respective policies (to optimise food production and groundwater use) with environmental concerns in mind. We represent this problem as an open-loop Nash game, which compares the game-theoretical solution to a centrally planned solution. We show that the inefficiencies arise from differences in the account taken of relevant costs by different authorities. We demonstrate that the magnitude of the inefficiency generated by the absence of coordination of our authorities varies depending on the weights put on environmental benefits by each authority, and discuss the implications of analysis for future research and policy.

Keywords: H23; Q18; Q28; R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2013, 64 (2), pp.423-445. ⟨10.1111/j.1477-9552.2012.00374.x⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Potential Conflict and Inefficiencies Arising in Agri-environmental Management (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.2012.00374.x

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

Page updated 2023-03-26
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01500877