 Parental Morbidity, Child Work, and Health Insurance in RwandaMaame Woode, Marwân-al-Qays Bousmah () and Raouf Boucekkine () Post-Print from HAL Abstract: Measuring direct and indirect effects of extending health insurance coverage in developing countries is a key issue for health system development and for attaining universal health coverage. This paper investigates the role played by health insurance in the relationship between parental morbidity and child work decisions. We use a propensity score matching technique combined with hurdle models, using data from Rwanda. The results show that parental health shocks have a substantial influence on child work when households do not have health insurance. Depending on the gender of the sick parent, there is a substitution effect not only between the parent and the child on the labor market, but also between the time the child spends on different work activities. Altogether, results reveal that health insurance protects children against child work in the presence of parental health shocks. Keywords: Child work; Health insurance; health shocks; Hurdle model; Propensity scores; Rwanda (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in JODE - Journal of Demographic Economics, 2017, 83 (1), pp.111-127. ⟨10.1017/dem.2016.28⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01505774 DOI: 10.1017/dem.2016.28 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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