Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus

Laure Kuhfuss, Raphaële Préget (), Sophie Thoyer () and Nick Hanley

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This article shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers' participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of winegrowers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others' participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmen-tal social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.

Keywords: behavioural economics; choice experiment; collective incentive; payment for environmental services; social norm; comportement des agriculteurs; contrat agrienvironnemental; gestion collective; pollution de l'eau (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01506443v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (80)

Published in European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2016, 43 (4), pp.609-636. ⟨10.1093/erae/jbv031⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-01506443v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01506443

DOI: 10.1093/erae/jbv031

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().