Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence

Olivier Bonroy, Alexis Garapin and Daniel Llerena ()
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Daniel Llerena: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019], UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]

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Abstract: This paper considers the effects that the opportunity to change partners has on communication. Our experiment concerns a standard cheap talk game in which a player observes a private forecast before disclosing it (truthfully or untruthfully) in a message that he sends to his partner. Two treatments are applied: in one, each team remains unchanged until the experiment ends; and in the other, players can change their partner. We find that the opportunity to change partners positively affects communication in the relationship. Interestingly, this effect is explained by higher levels of trust in the messages and not by more truthful disclosure of private information.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 13 (2), pp.197-216. ⟨10.1111/ijet.12125⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence (2017)
Working Paper: Changing partner in a cheap talk game: experimental evidence (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01523755

DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12125

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