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Judicial Independance in the European Court of Human Rights

Eric Langlais, Alessandro Melcarne () and Giovanni Ramello ()

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Abstract: This work takes profit from a peculiar aspect of International adjudication, namely the award of monetary compensation to victims of breach of International commitments. In particular, the present analysis focuses on the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the mechanism behind the award of monetary redress in terms of just satisfaction to individual victims injured by the breach of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Based on the empirical analysis conducted on an innovative dataset concerning states

Keywords: law enforcement; repeat offender; deterrence; human rights; international law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Published in 12th Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law & Economics , 2016, Torino, Unknown Region

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01549904

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